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You JUST CAN'T CRISPIN BRAINS IN A VAT
David Miguel Gray
Columbia University
P.F. Strawson once wrote, "One of the marks, though not a
necessary mark, of a really great philosopher isto make a really great
mistake." On first reading of Hilary Puh1am' s "Brains in a Vat" many
people think that's exactly what he did, "make a really great mis
take." I hope to arrive at a defense of Putnam's argument in light of
recent criticism by Crispin Wright. I will begin by examining both
the examples Puh1am creates and their presentation. Second, I will
take a look at the conclusion Puh1am draws from his proof. Next, a
brief digression will lead us into a discussion of two different types
of skepticism and which one applies to Putnam's proof. I will then
focus on the problem of the metaphysical realist and the applicability
of the brain in a vat example to its plight. Finally I will discuss
Wright's criticisms of Putnam's proof and what we may learn from
it.
In Putnam's refutation of the brain-in-vat skl~ptic, he uses his
second scenario of how the 'brains in a vat' picture works. In this
case, the external world consists of living and functioning brains and
their nervous systems. These are all contained in a large vat. The
brains' individual nerve endings are hooked up to a fantastic com
puter. This computer, the automatic machinery, exists as the brains
and the vat do, because it just happens to be the actual world, that is,
no one made the computer. So what happens?
Being that all the individuals are hooked up to the same
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computer, they all suffer from a collective hallucination as Putnam calls
it. This means that they all see computer-induced images and that

none of them have privileged access to the external world; they are
all being deceived. If you and I were two of these brains, let us
pretend just for a moment, both of us would receive all the sensory
inputs required to be able to lisee trees", "touch trees", and "throw
rocks". The computer is very powerful and allows us to have the
impression of interacting with the objects that we see; it also allows
us to rearrange them in our environment. Similarly it allows me to
communicate with the other brains in the vat. When I come up with
thoughts, the computer processes them so that I am deceived into
thinking that I hear myself speaking and feel my lips moving and feel
sounds coming through my throat. Likewise.. the brains listening to
me are deceived into thinking that they are hearing my voice instead
of just receiving my thoughts, via the computer, and may respond to
me as adequately as I spoke to them.

This is merely a more

roundabout process than what we think is actually going on. It is
clear that the brains may refer to images in their sensual 'World, but can
they, as Putnam asks in the first chapter of Reason, Truth and History,
"refer to external objects at all? (As opposed to, for example, objects
in the image produced by the automatic machinery)" (12).
By 'sensual world' I mean the world of sensory perceptions
that is created by the machine sending the brains electrical impulses
and not the reality of their external world, which they do not know.
When I refer to people's sensual world, assuming of course that we are
not being decei ved/ I mean the world of sensory perceptions that has
a corresponding external reality. For instance a brain in a vat's hnage
of a coffee cup is actually induced by a computer where a person's
image of a coffee cup corresponds to an actual coffee cup.
It is important to try to realize what the brains are doing
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when they are speaking or thinking about things. A brain's external
world consists of itself and other brains, a vat filled with nutritive
fluids, and a fantastic computer, none of which it can see nor can it
know that it exists as such. In addition to this, the brains have always
been in this envir0IU11ent and have no more of a reason to think that
they are brains in a vat than we do. What the brains do see is their
sensual world, which resembles the external world we live in (we are
no longer pretending to be brains in a vat). They can only make
references to things they see in their world. For instance, if a brain in
a vat says, "There is a lamp in front of me" what it is really saying is,
"There is an image of a lamp in front of me."
I would like to expand upon Putnam's ideas concerning the

mental images of brains in a vat. For example, the context of the
brains' dreams would be mental images based on images presented
to them by the computer, and, likewise, when they imagine things
not in their sensual world, this is simply done by manipulating a
collection of the images that they have seen. For instance, they woukl
obtain the mental image of a brain in a vat hooked up to a com puler
because they have seen a brain, a vat, and a computer. Like I.hdr
language, their mental images also center arollnd their sensunl
world. This means that they cannot possess what I will call n

transcendental imagination, that is, they cam10t cross the boundaries of
their sensual world and refer to or accurately contemplate things in
their external world. Even if the brains could correctly imagine what
their situation is, this would be a fluke. (For instance, they would
have no way of knowing whether they were brains in a vat 01' bnlim;
in a swimming pool, and the proper guess would n't dCm(mH~I'atl~
actual knowledge of the situation.) Furthermore, since they don't
have a h'anscendental imagination, their imaginations couicin' t even
mistakenly refer to their situation in the external wo1'ld because I:hcir
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referential capabilities are limited to the sensual world.
I will briefly digress to discuss why Putnam doesn't use his
first scenario, the original scenario, of the brain in a vat for his
argument. The first case consists of a brain in a vat filled with nutrient
fluids which is hooked up to a computer built by an evil scientist.
With this first case, an externalist conception is possible. One may
say that the images that the brain perceives are not non-referential
images. The image of a lamp may be given to the brain by the
computer, but the evil scientist, who has actually interacted with a
lamp, programmed the computer to give such an image. Therefore,
the brain.5 are justperceivin.g a lamp in a round-about way, and to say
that this is not an actual perception is just a prejudice towards
computer received perceptions. And while the brairts don't perceive
these objects that we perceive in the correct 'order', so to speak, as
they are in the world external to the vats, the objects were per~eived
by the scientist and then fed into the computer, and so much of the
brains knowledge of the external world is both referential and true.
This is a very important point.

Crispin Wright, in his lecture

"Putnam's Proof that We Are Not Brains in a Vat," elaborates on this
by suggesting that, "The standard brain-in-a-vat fantasy is, whereas
Putnam's is not, consistent with the truth of most of my beliefs about
the material world" (Reading Putnam, 218). Wright continues:

The difference, in other words, is this: a skeptical
argument which works with Putnam's fantasy can
directly transmit our (putative) lack of warranted
assurance that the fantasy is false into lack of war
ranted assurance that most of our ordinary beliefs
about the material world are true. But no such direct
transmission is possible if the argument works with
the standard fantasy (219).

You JUST CAN'T CRISPIN BRAlNS IN A VAT

5

It is most likely because of these easy refutations that Putnam
created the second case to avoid the possible criticisms that the evil
scientist allows brains to make indirect causal references to external
objects. But to solely address the first case and treat it as a way out
of the skeptic's conception of the mind is to avoid the full strength of
Putnam's article.
One of the points Putnam is able to demonstrate with the
second case is that the brains' language is only referring to images
and not actual things. By holding this position, we may not develop
any externalist conception of the brains' sensual world. There is no
causal COlmection between the images that the brains'see' in their
sensual world and real objects. If one of the brains thinks it sees an
image of a lamp, there is not an actual lamp because only electrical
impulses that the computer sends allow the brain to create an image
of a lamp. The electrical impulses given by the computer which allow
the brain to create this picture are simply part of the computer's
nature. There is no achmllamp, just a program that allows the brain
to create an image of it.
The question Putnam raised earlier of whether 01' not brains
can refer to externa1 objects at all allows him to come to the conclu
sion that it is impossible to say or think that we are brains in a vat.
Putnam's self-refuting argument, as he calls it, is basically this:

although the people in that possible world [the brains]
can think and'say' any words we can think and say,
they cannot (I claim) refer to what we can refer to. In
particular, they cannot think or say that they are
brains in a vat (evenby thinking I we m'e brains ill a vat')
(Reason, 8).
Putnam's idea of a self-refuting argument differs slightly from
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traditional conceptions of self-refuting arguments in that the conclu
sion is a little harder to reach because of implicit meanings. How
ever, like all self-refuting arguments, Putnam's argument is one in
which a part of the hypothesis is contradicted. Putnam argues that,
"part of the hypothesis that we are brains in a vat is that we aren't
brains in a vat in the image" (IS). This may be simplified by saying
that it is implicit within the concept of being brains in a vat that we
can not think of ourselves as brains in a vat in the image, that is, we do
not see ourselves as brains in a vat. However, whenever supposedly
envatted brains refer to something, they are referring to that some
thing in the image, for example, there is an image of a lamp in front
of us. Following from this, whenever an individual brain would say
'I am a brain in a vat' it is actually saying 'I am a brain in a vat in the
image/. This contradicts the part of the hypothesiS that says that if we
are brains in a vat, we cannot be brains in a vat in the image. Because
of this/ the statement /we are brains in a vat' made by the brains is
necessarily false. It should also be said that all of this also holds for
a brain thinking that it is a brain in a vat, though this is a minor point.
Much like the language the brain uses to refer to its sensual world, its
'linguistic thoughts', or thoughts in the form of words/ refer to the
sensual world as well. Furthermore, as I stated earlier in the paper,
thebrain gets its mental images, and hence many of its thoughts from
the sensual world. Perhaps it is most easily stated by saying that
regardless of whether a brain says or thinks /we are brains in a vat',
it still contradicts the hypothesis.

The major question still remains: how does Putnam's objec
tion to the brain-in-a-vat skeptic help us with the problem of skepti
cism. The answer to this question actually lies in the previous
sentence and is perhaps the greatest misinterpretation of Putnam/s
article. The brain-in-a-vat skeptic is not what we might think it to be.
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In order to explain this I would like to describe two skeptical
positions Putnam describes as Infinitely Regressive and InternaL
An infinitely regressive skeptic is of the type that no matter
what premises you present the individ ual with, you will most likely
get the response"And how do you know that?" or "Can you prove
it?". This sort of skeptic is virtually impossible to please unless

presented with the simplest of arguments such as whether or not we
exist. Putnam had no intentions of refuting infinitely regressive
skepticism.
Putnam states in his "Comments and Replies to Crispin
Wright" that, lithe aim of the internal skeptic is to convince us, on the
basis of assumptions we ourselves hold, that all or a large part of our
claims about the empirical world cannot amount to
knowledge"(Reading, 284). Putnam's brain in a vat argument was
geared towards disproving this lype of skepticism.
Let's go back to infinitely regressive skepticism for a mo
ment. Let us imagine the following scenario: You are on a spaceship
exploring the outer limits of the galaxy when you and your crew
happen upon a space station which wasn't made by human beings.
Let us, for tiLe sake of the example, suppose that no one made it, the
station just happens to be another world of sorts. Upon entering the
space station you see a large vat filled with billions of brains and an
enormous computer that appears to be cOlmected to each one. After
examining the brains and running some tests on them, they appear
to be isomorphic to humanbrains. Also at the computer is a terminal
with a video screen and a video camera and microphone that allows
you to view the brains world. The computer also takes images of you
on the outside world and transforms the image of you into an image
of a regular individual in the world of the envatted brains. After
using this terminal to talk to other brains and explore their world,
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you find that it is identical to earth, a twin-earth of sorts. Evenhtally
you happen upon a brain who happens to be a philosophy shldent
and is familiar with Putnam's article (even Putnam has a brain
cOlUlterpart on this space station). After trying to inform the student
of its situation the brain presents you with Putnam's argument,
thereby proving that it is not a brain in a vat. After repeatedly trying
to convince the brain that it is in fact a brain in a vat you give up and
return to your home planet.
This scenario is the product of an infinitely regressive skep
tical position. Putnam's argument keeps us from saying md think
ing'wearebrainsinvats'inresponsetothehypothesis. Thus we may
not speak or think of the issue. Nevertheless, the possibility remains

that we are brains in a vat, even though we may not speak or think on
the matter and come to the conclusion that this is true. Although we
may not speak of i t, we could possibly accept such a position since we
have not been convinced that such a position is impossible.
My reply to this scenario, and I imagine Pu111am would take
a similar stance, is that of course this example can't be refuted: it has
already been verified that the possibility is true, that is, the envaUed
brains do exist, md there is nothing we can do to argue against this.
This is what infinitely regressive skepticism is capable of: presenting
a possibility that no matter what argument is used against it, it can
always answer with, "What if?"
We may conclude that Putnam's argument doesn't even
entirely rule out the brain-in-a-vat skeptic, it merely shuts it up.
While Putnam's essay does make some very good points and does
present a useful skeptical scenario in a materialist framework, his
solution to the brain in the vat problem may only be considered a
small contribution to the battle against skepticism.
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While most of the things the infinitely regressive skeptic
claims are correct, none of it matters! As said earlier, Putnam had no
intention of refuting infinitely regressive skepticism. Furthermore,
his goal was not to deliver a crushing blow to epistemological
skepticism. Rather, as Crispin Wright correctly claims, "Putnam's
real project is, as so often, to embarrass the metaphysical realist"
(Reading, 217). And what is this metaphysical realist? To put it
vaguely, since I've never seen it put otherwise, the metaphysical
realist sees the world as set, a place where things exist objectively
apartfrom our conception ofthem. The metaphysical realist believes
that we can only hope to develop a view of the world that actually
corresponds, at least in its basic suppositions, with the way the world
really is. This barrier between our thoughts of the world and how the
world really exists is what prevents us from developing an indubi~
table picture of reality. As Wright adds in his concluding remarks
concerning metaphysical realism, IIThis is what commits the meta
physical realist to the possibility that even an ideal theory might be
false or seriously incomplete"(Rendin.g, 238). Wright continues:

Once one thinks of the world in that way, one is
presumably committed to the bare possibility of con
ceptual creatures naturally so constituted as not to be
prone to form concepts which reflect the real kinds
that there are. The real character of the world and its
constituents would thus elude both the cognition and
comprehension of such creatures (238).
These metaphysical realists are exactly the types of creatures
Putnam intended the brains in a vat to be. They, like the envatted
thinkers, have no actual link with their external reality that they can
be sure of. However, they do believe in semantic externalism, which
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Putnam describes as currentphilosophy-of-Ianguage jargon for the
IJ

idea that meaning and reference are subject to causal constraints"

(Reading, 285). The metaphysical realists must believe this, for how
would they even attempt to describe the world if they didn't believe
that they were somehow causally related to it? This is the strength
of the argument from the position of internal skepticism. The
internal skeptic is taking the possibilities that the metaphysical
realist believes in as premises: First, that we may be brains in a vat,
and second, that we have some sort of causal relations to the world.
As we have already seen, the belief that they are brains in a vat and
the belief that they can refer to brains in a vat is what got them into
trouble.
Crispin Wright feels that in addition to being of little episte
mological significance, Putnam's proof misses the mark, or marks,
when dealing with metaphysical realism. The central problem
Wright has with Putnam's proof is that it seems to answer specific
types of metaphysical realism that can be discussed instead of meta
physical realism in general. Wright clarifies this position by saying
th.at we "convict metaphysical realism" of something similar to the
idea of O-inconsistency:

An Q-inconsistent system of arithmetic, recalt is one
which, for some arithmetic predicate F, both contains
a proof that there is an x such that not Fx and proofs
of each statement of the form, Fn, "n" being a nu
meral. Simple inconsistency is avoided only because
the recognition that each Fn is provable cannot be
accomplished via means formalizable within the sys
tem (239).
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This means that metaphysical realists must accept that they are
in a general sort of condition, like Fn, which is impossible to refute.
To flesh this out a bit more, we may be in a general state, a cognitive
II

predicament of a certain very general sort" as Wright states. How
ever, when presented with a specific example of what that state
might be, like Fx, we find that such specific sihlations are often
refutable. Wright claims thatthis is the case with Puhlam's example.
Wright defends this position by clarifying the predicament of
the metaphysical realist. In reference to Putnam's conclusion con
cerning the unthinkability of the brain in a vat scenario:

... the sort of dislocation whose possibility is argu
ably implicit in metaphysical realism does not in
volve that its victims can concephlalize their predica
ment; quite to the contrary - their predicament con
sists in part precisely in the fact that they are debarred
from arriving at the concepts necessary to capture the
most fundamental feahtres of their world and their
place in it (Reading, 239).
This provides support for Wright's claim that "Putnam's pl:oof
does not represent a general method. of disproving any specific
version of the relevant kind of possibilitYi at best, it represents a
general method for disproving any specific version which we can
understand" (ReadingJ 239).

An obvious problem just presented itself. The treatment of

a

the metaphysical realist In Crispin Wright does something Puhlam
never intended. Postulating that we still may be brains in a vat or
somethingelse which we cannotunderstand, is to expect our thoughts
to transcend the reality that they must subscribe to. We would have
to have a transcendental imagination. For metaphysical realists to
transcend their linguistic constraints would be nothing short of
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divine and to claim that doing this is a possibility would be to leave
the realm of internal skepticism and enter into infinitely regressive
skepticism. Putnam never intended to defend against this line of
argument.
Puhlam sums this up by saying, in his reply to Wright,
"Wright's paper ... seems to waver between pointing out that
infinitely regressive skepticism has still not been refuted, and at
tempting a reply on behalf of an internal skeptic. But if the latter is
Wright's intention, it is not clear what the reply is" (Reading, 285).
The only question left then is, "What may we salvage from
Crispin Wright's argument?" Is there any way to Crispin brains in
a vat? It seems from what we have seen that Wright's argument does
not apply to brains in a vat. What I believe Wl'ight does do is present
an important aspect of the metaphysical realist. I don't believe that
the brain-in-a-vat argument applies to all metaphysical realists, as I
believe Putnam would also hold. What Wright has introduced is that
complete satisfaction for some metaphysical realist would involve
something that is perhaps unattainable. Certain metaphysical real
ists might hold that they must answer the doubts of infinitely
regressive skeptics in addition to internal skeptics. This shows us
that whether or not such a conception of reality could be true, large
portions of this conception are unthinkable. So while we may be able
to Crispin the metaphysiral realist, we just can't Crispin brains in a
vat.
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